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FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MAR 1 1 2008

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COUNT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

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DEP	UTY	CLERK

MONDOR	KHOURY,)		03-cv-01225-DLJ 99-cr-00093-DLJ
		Petitioner,)		
	v.)	ORDI	2D
UNITED	STATES OF	AMERICA,)	OKD.	
		Defendant.)		

On March 28, 2001, Mondor Khoury (Khoury) was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine.

On June 27, 2001, Khoury was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. On direct appeal, his convictions and sentence were affirmed on July 2, 2002.

Khoury filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on June 9, 2003, on grounds of: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3) judicial errors at sentencing in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). On June 14, 2005, the Court dismissed most of the claims and ordered an evidentiary hearing on Khoury's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On January 19, 2007, following a January 10 hearing, the Court dismissed two of the ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims. At an evidentiary hearing on

August 14, 2007, the Court heard testimony by Khoury and by both of his trial attorneys, Robert Blasier (Blasier) and Peter Kmeto (Kmeto), regarding proposed plea agreements that Khoury claims was never communicated to him by his counsel. Khoury says that he first became aware of the existence of a proposed written plea agreement in 2004 after his wife retrieved his case file from his trial attorney.

Having reviewed the papers submitted, the arguments of counsel, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Khoury's § 2255 motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background has been previously recounted in the Court's order of June 14, 2005.

Following his arrest in this case on September 14, 1999,

Khoury was assigned Charles M. Bonneau Jr. (Bonneau) to represent

him on the drug trafficking charges filed against him. On

January 20, 2000, Robert D. Blasier Jr. (Blasier) replaced

Bonneau as Khoury's attorney.

Blasier testified that during the time he represented

Khoury, he engaged in negotiations with the government for

resolution of the case through a guilty plea in light of the fact

that Khoury faced a possible sentence between 20 years and life

in prison if convicted at trial. There was, additionally, a risk

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that his co-conspirators would testify against him at trial. On May 15, 2000, pursuant to the negotiations, Khoury debriefed with the prosecutor and investigating agents for the government regarding his involvement in the drug conspiracy. During this debriefing, Blasier concluded that Khoury was being deceptive and the government's attorney advised Blasier that he likewise doubted Khoury's veracity.

Blasier testified that he negotiated a potential plea agreement for Khoury that contemplated reduction of his sentence to a term of 87 months and additionally provided for the possibility of further reduction if Khoury substantially assisted the government in its criminal investigations and prosecutions. Khoury insisted that the plea be binding on the court and the probation office. A plea agreement of this type, however, was not available as the government refused to enter a plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C), the predecessor to the present Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Blasier, however, recommended to Khoury that he plead under the agreement which had been proffered by the government. A change of plea hearing was calendered for November 9, 2000.

At the hearing on November 9, 2000, Khoury refused to sign the plea agreement because it was not binding on the court.

Thereafter, Blasier found that his relationship with his client

had deteriorated to the point that he could no longer adequately represent Khoury. Peter Kmeto (Kmeto) replaced Blasier as Khoury's counsel.

On January 4, 2001, the grand jury returned a third superseding indictment charging Khoury with four counts charging conspiracy to manufacture drugs and possession with intent to distribute drugs. Kmeto immediately began preparing for trial.

As Khoury's co-conspirators had, by this point, all pled guilty, Kmeto also tried to negotiate a plea agreement. The government advised Kmeto that Khoury would have to plead to a greater term as the earlier offer was no longer available. Kmeto stated that he discussed this offer with Khoury but that Khoury was not interested in it.

II. DISCUSSION

Khoury's only outstanding claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Under Strickland, Khoury must show first that defense counsel's performance was deficient, and second that defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his case. Id at 687-88, 694. The court is not required to consider both components of this inquiry if the petitioner has made an insufficient showing on one. Id at 697. Khoury fails to establish the

necessary facts to demonstrate his counsel's ineffective assistance.

To establish deficient performance Khoury must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id at 688. He claims that defense counsel failed to advise him of the plea offer under which he would serve at most 87 months. A failure of counsel to advise his client of a plea offer constitutes a gross deviation from accepted professional standards. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zlinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3rd Cir. 1982)).

Both Blasier and Kmeto testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had in fact conveyed the terms of proposed plea agreements to Khoury, and had discussed such proposed pleas with him. It was developed at the hearing that Blasier had written a letter to Khoury in which he stated that he did not have any discussion with Khoury about possible plea agreements. At the hearing Blasier stated that he had written the letter, but that it was his first response when Khoury contacted him several years after his representation, and that he had not reviewed hir files when he sent the letter. Blasier further stated that his response was different after reviewing the file, in particular a September 10, 2000, memorandum he had written stating that he had

sent a copy of the proposed plea agreement to Khoury, and a September 18, 2000, memorandum he had sent to the prosecution requesting additions and changes to the plea offer. Khoury testified at the evidentiary hearing and stated that he did recall verbal discussions with Blasier about proposed plea agreements, but that he had never seen any written plea offer.

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The contradictory testimony presented in the hearing raises credibility issues for the Court to resolve. In addition to the testimony cited, the Court notes two other circumstances. already indicated, a change of plea hearing is shown on the case docket. This event supports a finding that it was preceded by discussions involving the prosecutor and defense counsel, and by Khoury and his counsel. The Court finds that Blasier's testimony is true when he stated that, in accordance with his usual practice, he had shown the proposed plea agreement to Khoury at The Court further notes that the sentencing Judge added 2 levels to the base offense level calculation based upon his finding that Khoury had testified falsely at the trial. this record the Court finds that Blasier's testimony truthfully describes what happened and supports a decision that Counsel's performance was not deficient under the first prong of the <u>Strickland</u> test. <u>See Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-89.

Because Khoury's claim fails the deficient performance prong

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L	of the <u>Strickland</u> test, the Court need not proceed to the second
2	prong requiring a showing of prejudice. The Court notes,
3	however, that this prong would require the Court to find that
1	Khoury was credible when he says that he would have agreed to a
5	plea if he had been shown the written plea proposal itself. The
5	same reasons that led the Court to find that Khoury was not
7	credible as to the issue posed by the first prong would be
3	equally relevant to the second prong.
9	III. CONCLUSION
LO	For the reasons stated above, Khoury's § 2255 motion is
L1	DENIED on its merits.
L2	
L3	IT IS SO ORDERED
L 4	
L5	Dated: March 10, 2008
L6	D. Lowell Jensen
L7	United States District Judge
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